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The United States relies on charity to provide the uninsured with medical care, most of which is 
offered by hospitals that act as providers of last resort and constitute the safety net. Traditionally, 
these hospitals have been able to finance their provision of unfunded care through a complex 
system of cross-subsidies. The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects that financial 
pressures have on the provision of charity care by hospitals. To do so we look at the effect of 
price pressures and at the cost-controlling mechanisms imposed by managed care. Our hypothesis 
is that price competition, or other forms of financial pressure, undermines the ability of a hospital 
to cross-subsidize and challenges their survival. Our results show that managed care has a 
disproportionately negative effect on the closure of safety net hospitals. Moreover, amongst those 
that remain open, in areas where managed care penetration increases the most, safety net 
hospitals react by closing the health services (emergency rooms, obstetrics and alcohol and drug 
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I. Introduction  
In 2007, more than 46 million people in the United States lacked health insurance coverage.
2 
Approximately two-thirds of them lived in families whose income was below 200 percent of the 
poverty line (Kaiser, 2008). The uninsured are reported to be less likely to receive health care 
(American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine, 2000) and more likely 
to exhibit worst health outcomes (Meara, 1998; Doorslaer et al., 1997; Ettner, 1996). 
The United States relies on charity to provide the uninsured with medical care, most of which is 
offered by hospitals that serve as providers of last resort. They constitute what is called the 
Safety Net and it consists mainly of teaching hospitals, public hospitals and hospitals located in 
poor areas. For many years, those hospitals had been able to finance their provision of charity 
care through a complex system of cross-subsidies from privately-insured paying patients to the 
uninsured ones. This “hidden tax” has been estimated by the American Hospital Association 
(1986) to be around 10.5 percent. Hence, a hospital’s ability to obtain high revenues plays a 
crucial role in its facility to provide charity care. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects that financial pressures have on the 
provision of charity care by hospitals. Our first hypothesis is that price competition, or other 
forms of financial pressure, undermines the ability of a hospital to cross-subsidize. This imposes 
a large strain on safety net hospitals, challenging their financial sustainability and their 
survival. Hence, we expect to observe more safety net hospital closures in areas where financial 
pressures are of greater magnitude. 
Our second hypothesis relates to the types of services that the safety net hospitals will provide 
in areas where financial pressures are more important. The United States system also establishes 
                                              
1 We are grateful to SP-SP research Centre for research support. We thank David M. Cutler; Bruno Cassiman, and the 
many participants in the Harvard public finance research seminar and workshop and in the ASHE meetings for 
comments on a previous draft. We are also grateful to Mireia Raluy and Ona Vilanou for outstanding research 
assistantship. Financial support from Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2006-11833. 
2 DeNavas-Walt, C.B. Proctor, and J. Smith, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 
2007,” United States Census Bureau; August 2008.  
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antidumping
3 rules and requires the hospitals that have emergency rooms to supply emergency 
indigent care in two situations: a life-threatening health problem or active labor. Given this, we 
expect that, for the hospitals that remain open, strong financial pressures lead to the closure of 
precisely the services most commonly used by the uninsured - emergency rooms (Stern et al., 
1991), obstetrics (Sloan et al., 1986; Fournier and Campbell, 1997) and alcohol and drug 
treatment centers (Cousineau, 1997). 
For our analysis we will focus on the diffusion of managed care because it is one of the most 
important changes that the United States healthcare market has experienced in the last decades 
and it has been identified as a “primary force” affecting hospital revenues (Duke, 1996). 
Managed care has imposed strong financial pressure and utilization controls on health 
providers to achieve its cost-containment objective. 
Moreover, managed care has played a crucial role in shaping today´s healthcare marketplace in 
the United States. And, today, it completely dominates the United States health care insurance 
market. It has changed its competition (Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997) and the reimbursement 
mechanisms for ever. For instance, by initially paying prices about 30 percent below those paid 
by traditional insurers (Cutler and Barro, 1997), managed care organizations affected the 
retribution system in the whole marketplace. It contributed to contain doctor wages, not only 
within the managed care network but also in the entire health care market, increasing 
competition amongst providers. Hence, even those hospitals that did not belong to the managed 
care network ended up changing their reimbursement schemes. Understanding the effect of 
managed care on the provision of charity care by hospitals is a first step in helping us 
comprehend the role that current financial pressures could have on the health of the uninsured. 
Our analysis will focus on the period from 1985 to 1995, which corresponds to the diffusion of 
managed care in the United States. 
The impact of the managed care boom has been subjected to close scrutiny in recent years. 
Most of the literature has concentrated on analyzing the role of managed care in bringing 
efficiency gains to the health care market or on studying the impact of managed care on the 
utilization and quality of care for its enrollees. In this respect, Levit et al. (1998) and Melnick 
and Zwanzinger (1996) point out that managed care is responsible for a large part of the 
slowdown in expenditure growth in health care. Mas and Seinfeld (2008) show that, by 
reducing technology adoption, managed care can lead to an important reduction in health care 
costs, and Luft and Miller (1997) find mixed results for managed care performance on the 
quality of care for those patients with managed care insurance. 
However, most of the research to date has focused on the performance of managed care as 
compared to other types of health insurance, and very little work has been done to analyze the 
impact of managed care on the provision of charity care by hospitals. Currie and Fahr (2001) 
show that, in California, higher rates of managed care penetration lead to an increase in the 
share of uninsured patients treated by public hospitals at the expense of losing the more 
profitable Medicaid patients to private hospitals. Richardson (2000) finds a negative impact of 
managed care on access to care for the poor by observing how the provision of emergency 
room services and the number of hospitals in poor areas changes with the penetration of 
managed care. 
                                              
3 Dumping occurs when a hospital transfers an emergency patient to another or simply refuses any treatment based 
on the patient’s inability to pay.   
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This paper contributes toward filling the gap in the literature by analyzing the effect that 
financial pressures and, in particular, managed care penetration have on the provision of 
uncompensated care by hospitals. 
Our results are twofold. First, we find that market pressures established by managed care have a 
positive effect on the closure of hospitals. As expected from our first hypothesis, this outcome 
is more important for safety net hospitals since they are now under more financial stress 
because managed care challenges their ability to keep cross-subsidizing. 
Second, our results confirm that, in areas where managed care penetration has increased the 
most, more of those services generally used by the uninsured have been terminated. This effect 
is greater for hospitals located in poor neighborhoods and for government hospitals. 
Finally, we are also interested in deriving some possible implication that managed care might 
have on access to care for the uninsured since, by encouraging the closure of safety net 
hospitals, it can be negatively affected. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most relevant 
characteristics of managed care and the provision of charity care in the United States. Section 3 
presents the hypothesis on the effect that financial pressures imposed by managed care might 
have on the provision of charity care by hospitals. The data is described in Section 4 and the 
methodology and results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
II. Managed Care and the Safety Net 
2.1. Managed Care 
In the past several years, the health care market in the United States has undergone massive 
changes. The most important has been the shift from traditional insurance to managed care. 
The percentage of privately-insured Americans that had a health care managed care contract 
went from 27 percent in 1988 to 93 percent in 2001. Managed care includes a wide variety of 
health insurance contracts, with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) being the most 
restrictive ones. Other forms of managed care contracts are the Independent Practice 
Associations (IPAs), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and the Point-Of-Service (POS). 
They differ in the payment to network providers as well as in the copayments faced by the 
patients when they use services inside and outside the network. For instance, those patients 
who have an HMO contract are only allowed to visit the network providers and have to pay the 
full cost if they use someone outside the network. Here, the insurance and provision of health 
care are fully integrated, doctors are generally paid a salary and they work exclusively for the 
HMO. In the IPAs, practitioners can contract with as many networks as they wish. Generally, 
the IPA withholds a share of the fees as a reserve against high costs and this share is given 
back to the doctors if costs are kept sufficiently low. In PPOs, the insurance company contracts 
a selected group of providers, who are generally paid on a discounted fee-for-service basis. The 
insured under this type of contract pay little when they use a physician from the network and 
more when they use other physicians. Finally, the POS allows its insured to visit providers 
outside the network but they then face higher copayments.  
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Even though there are a wide variety of managed care contracts, they all have some aspects in 
common: they all involve a controlled form of financing and delivering health care that is 
based on cost-containment and a controlled use of health care services. 
In traditional health insurance plans, a contract can be defined along three dimensions: a 
premium, a set of covered benefits and a certain copayment that applies to these benefits. In 
addition to these, managed care plans introduced some additional mechanisms that comprise 
the selection of providers, the methods used for paying providers and some systems to control 
service utilization. 
Managed care removes free provider choice by establishing a network of pre-approved 
providers. In general the patient pays nothing (or very little) if she uses the providers in the 
network but she faces higher costs (they can even be full cost) if she uses a provider that does 
not belong to the network. 
Traditional insurance paid providers on a fee-for-service basis. Managed care uses several 
reimbursement mechanisms: salaries, capitation and fee-for-service. Nonetheless, even fee-for-
service managed care plans pay physicians prices that are below those usually paid by 
traditional insurance. Cutler and Barro (1997) mention payments that are up to 30 percent 
below and Gold et al. (1995) also find evidence of a “discounted” fee-for-service paid by 
managed care. 
Managed care uses several methods to control the use of health care services. For instance, it 
uses primary care physicians as “gatekeepers”, requiring their previous referral before the 
enrollees can consult a specialist. Many plans also limit the number of hospital days and 
require physicians to follow some established guidelines to treat a certain diagnosis. 
2.2. The Safety Net 
The number of uninsured in the United States has been rising since 1987, jumping from 31.8 
million to almost 46 million in 2007. In 2007 about two thirds of the uninsured were poor or 
near poor (Kaiser, 2008). Moreover, they are less likely to have a regular source of care or get 
medical care for serious conditions (American College of Physicians, 2000). 
Traditionally, the United States has relied on charitable medical care to serve the uninsured. 
These providers of last resort constitute the Safety Net. The system also establishes 
antidumping
4 rules and requires the hospitals that have emergency rooms to supply emergency 
indigent care in two situations: a life threatening health problem or active labor. 
United States spending on uncompensated care
5 has increased substantially in the past years, 
growing from 6.1 billion dollars in 1983 to 17.5 billion in 1995 and 24.9 billion in 2003, when 
its burden represented 5.5% of hospital total expenses (American Hospital Association). 
Hospitals have two sources to finance care for the poor: public and private funding. Public 
financing can be federal, state or local, but most of it comes from Medicare and Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Adjustments. Medicare DSH was established in 1986 to 
compensate hospitals for treating a disproportionately large number of Medicaid patients. In 
1997 these payments reached 4.8 billion dollars. 93% of them went to large urban hospitals and 
                                              
4 Dumping occurs when a hospital transfers an emergency patient to another or simply refuses any treatment based 
on the patient’s inability to pay.  
5 Uncompensated care includes bad debt and charity care provided by the hospital.  
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65% went to teaching hospitals. Medicaid DSH was established in 1981 to compensate hospitals 
with a large share of indigent patients who were not eligible for Medicaid. Private funding 
includes direct payments from patients as well as a complicated system of cross-subsidies, and 
hospitals used to raise prices for privately insured patients to cover the costs of providing care 
to the uninsured (AHA 1991,
6 Cutler, 1995
7). 
The distribution of uncompensated care varies greatly among hospital types and location 
(Table 1): major teaching hospitals represent only 8% of the market but provide about 30% of 
overall uncompensated care. Government hospitals represent a similar situation providing 
almost 40 percent of the overall uncompensated care, while they account only for 25% of the 
American health care market.
8 
The amount of charity care provided by a hospital has two components: demand and supply.  
Demand: Distance to the hospital is an important determinant in hospital choice (Burgess and 
DeFiore, 1994; Currie and Reagan, 1998). Hence, a hospital located in an area with a high 
proportion of uninsured is more likely to receive uninsured patients who cannot be turned 
away. Therefore, the demographic composition of the local population is an important 
determinant in the demand for uncompensated care that the hospital may face. 
Supply: The hospital’s willingness to provide uncompensated care may differ depending on its 
ownership. For instance, not-for-profit and government hospitals may be more willing to 
provide this kind of community service than for-profit ones. Such a mission may be reflected in 
the services and technologies that the hospital may offer (a substantial number of the poor and 
uninsured use emergency rooms to receive medical care, and obstetric services are also 
commonly used by the uninsured) as well as in the location of the hospital (in poor areas as 
opposed to rich areas). 28.7% of teaching hospitals, 21.1% of not-for-profit hospitals and 
20.4% of government hospitals are located in poor areas, while only 15.2% of for-profit ones 
are encountered in poor neighborhoods. 
Finally, looking at Table 1, we can clearly see that those types of hospitals that provide care to 
a disproportionate share of the uninsured are public hospitals, teaching hospitals and those 
located in poor areas. These are the ones that we will identify as safety net hospitals. 
III. Impact of Managed Care on the Hospital’s Provision of Charity 
Care. Hypothesis  
In this section we summarize the effects that the financial pressures imposed by managed care 
can have on the provision of charity care by hospitals, and we formulate the hypothesis that we 
will then test empirically. 
The first thing that we have to take into account is that different hospitals may have different 
reasons for providing charity care. For instance, they may care about the indigent population 
                                              
6 H. Aaron, in a study of the American Hospital Association calculates that the average paying hospital patient subsidizes 
charity care by paying a “hidden tax” of 10.6%. 
7 Almost a third of uncompensated care is paid by extra charges to the insured patients. 
8 Those hospitals that have a higher burden of charity care also provide care to a higher proportion of Medicaid 
patients (American Hospital Association).  
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and extract some utility from providing care to the uninsured, with public and teaching 
hospitals being more willing to provide this community service than the for-profit ones. This 
corresponds to what Frank and Salkever (1991) call a “purely altruistic” model. Another reason 
why hospitals may want to provide free care for the uninsured is because this may increase 
their reputation in the community or provide them with more donations or better fiscal 
treatment.
9 In this case hospitals may compete with the rest of the providers in the market for 
charity care, and the amount that they provide will also depend on the amount of charity care 
provided by their rivals. This is what Frank and Salkever (1991) call an “impure altruism” 
model. Similar reasoning can be applied to quality. Some hospitals may obtain utility directly 
from providing good quality care to their patients. This again may vary with the hospital 
ownership. Other hospitals may look at quality as a way to improve their reputation and, thus, 
to increase their profits. Hence, in our empirical specification we will include a dummy for each 
relevant hospital type – public hospital (P), teaching hospital (T) and hospitals located in poor 
areas (P) – to take this into account.  
Second, managed care can affect not only the hospitals that belong to its network but also all 
the hospitals that are in an area where managed care enrollment is substantial. For the 
hospitals that belong to the network, managed care organizations can have a direct effect since 
they are able to negotiate better prices and lower quantities of care with the hospitals. This 
lower reimbursement for the insured reduces the hospital’s excess revenues available to finance 
charity care, and undermines its ability to cross-subsidize uncompensated care. The financial 
strain that this might imply is stronger for those hospitals that are providing a big share of 
uncompensated care. Hence we will not only look at the managed care enrollment effect, but 
we will also interact it with the different hospital types to analyze whether managed care 
enrollment affects the safety net hospitals more severely. 
Hospitals that do not belong to the network observe how they lose some potential patients that 
have managed care contracts and are forced to go to their network hospitals. This decrease in 
the number of insured patients challenges their possibility of survival if the hospitals keep 
providing the same amount of care for the uninsured. Also, the overall market prices and 
physician practices are affected by managed care (Baker and Shankarkumar, 1997). Hence, the 
hospitals that do not belong to the network also suffer a reduction in their prices. This 
decreases hospitals’ revenues and makes cross-subsidization of uncompensated care more 
difficult. 
Moreover, managed care organizations may not be interested in including in their network 
those hospitals that provide a lot of charity care because such hospitals may have to charge 
higher prices in order to cross-subsidize their uninsured patients. Since a provider that does not 
belong to the network will not receive any managed care patients, and given the importance of 
managed care, hospitals may be discouraged from providing uncompensated care in order to be 
more likely to gain entry into a managed care network. 
This is the reason why we will use managed care enrollment measures at the level of the 
metropolitan area (henceforth, MSA). 
Taking this into account, we will test the following hypothesis: 
                                              
9 Fournier and Campbell (1997) find evidence showing that hospitals in Florida that provide greater amounts of care 
for the poor are systematically awarded licenses for certificate-of-need approval.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 7 
1. Our first hypothesis is that price competition, or other forms of financial pressures, 
undermines the ability of a hospital to cross-subsidize. This imposes a large strain on safety net 
hospitals, challenging their financial sustainability and their survival. Hence, we expect to 
observe more safety net hospital closures in areas where financial pressures are of greater 
magnitude. 
2.  Our second hypothesis relates to the types of services that the safety net hospitals will provide 
in areas where financial pressures are more important. Hospitals that are struggling for survival 
have more incentives to try to “avoid” non-paying patients. One way of doing so is by closing the 
set of services most commonly used by the uninsured. The United States system also establishes 
antidumping rules and requires the hospitals that have emergency rooms to supply emergency 
indigent care in two situations: a life threatening health problem or active labor. Given this, we 
expect that, for the hospitals that remain open, strong financial pressures lead to the closure of 
precisely those services most commonly used by the uninsured. The effects should be particularly 
severe for the safety net hospitals because they are the ones where the share of charity care 
patients is the largest. These services include emergency rooms, obstetrics and inpatient and 
outpatient care for alcohol and drug dependency. Regarding emergency rooms, for many of the 
United States urban poor, going to the doctor means showing up at a hospital emergency room 
(Shoor and Hughes, 1993; Stern et al., 1991; Freeman et al., 1990). Moreover, a substantial 
number of poor uninsured patients use the emergency room for primary care (Freeman and Corey, 
1993), and Currie and Reagan (1998) reported that uninsured children are five times more likely 
than other children to use the emergency room as their regular source of care.  
Obstetric units are the other group of services most commonly used by the uninsured. Hospitals 
are required to accept patients in active labor (Fournier and Campbell, 1997), and about a half 
of the inpatient admissions for charity care patients correspond to obstetrical deliveries and 
accident cases (Sloan et al., 1986). Finally, the indigent population is more likely to have 
alcohol or drug problems (Cousineau, 1997) and, hence, to disproportionately require the use of 
alcohol and drug treatment centers. 
3. Our third hypothesis takes into account the fact that different hospitals may have different 
reasons for providing charity care, and that safety net hospitals often act as providers of last 
resort. If this is the case, a safety net hospital that is the only one of its type in the metropolitan 
area might face many pressures (moral, political, etc) to keep operating, even if the financial 
environment is very adverse. To test whether this is the case, we will include a dummy variable 
ONLY that is equal to one if the hospital is the only one of its type (teaching, government, etc.) 
in the MSA, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, one of our objectives is to understand the effect that managed care, through its effect 
on the provision of charity care by hospitals, could have on access to care for the uninsured. 
When we look at access to care, the relevant variable to start with is the number of hospitals 
and services available in the MSA. If one hospital closes its ER and another one opens it, the 
effect on access to care is less clear. Hence, we will look at the effect that managed care has on 
the overall number of hospitals and the overall number of ER or obstetric services in the MSA. 
IV. Data 
Our goal is to understand the effect that managed care enrollment has had on the number of 
hospitals as well as on their provision of those health services more used by the uninsured.  
8 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
And, in particular, we want to test the hypothesis that those financial pressures have 
particularly strong effects for safety net hospitals. 
Summary statistics of all the following data are presented in Tables 2a and 2b. 
Hospital data: Information on whether a hospital closed or not and on the types of services it 
provides (emergency rooms, obstetrics, etc.) comes from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA).  
The AHA also provides information on whether the hospital is public or teaching and it 
includes its address and zip code. To determine if a hospital belongs to a poor neighborhood, 
we establish a ranking of the average income per capita in all the zip codes in the United States 
to find the level corresponding to the thirty-third percentile. Then we compute the average per 
capita income for the five-mile radius area surrounding the hospital. If it lies below the thirty-
third percentile level for the corresponding state, the hospital is considered to be located in a 
poor neighborhood. 
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the hospital is for profit or not-for-profit 
and we control for hospital size measured by the number of beds. 
Finally, we have also hypothesized the possibility that managed care has a different effect for 
those hospitals that are the only ones of their type in the MSA, especially if they are the only 
public hospital in the metropolitan area. We will, then, define a dummy variably ONLY that is 
equal to one if the hospital if the only one of its type in the MSA. 
Market data: Includes the occupancy rate in the MSA, the number of hospitals at the beginning 
of the period and the average hospital size. 
Managed care enrollment: To account for the effect of managed care on the quality of care for the 
uninsured, we use the share of the MSA population enrolled in HMOs. Unfortunately, enrollment 
data on other types of managed care contracts is not available. Moreover, HMO enrollment has 
been the standard measure for managed care enrollment used in the literature – see, for instance, 
Cutler and McClellan (1996); Baker, (1997); Cutler and Sheiner (1998). The Area Resource File has 
some information on managed care enrollment at the county level. However, it is problematic 
because it assigns membership in an HMO to the county where the HMO address is. However, 
members are usually located in many surrounding areas. In order to avoid this problem, we use 
data from the Baker estimates in managed care enrollment. Baker constructed estimates of 
county-level enrollment using data from the Group Health Association of America and he 
distributed HMO enrollment among the counties of its service area taking into account their 
population and the distance to the HMO headquarters. Moreover, in order to further lessen any 
potential problem, our analysis is done at the MSA level. 
Finally, there is the possibility that unobservable variables are correlated with both managed 
care market share and the provision of charity care. For instance, it could be the case that HMO 
enrollment increased more in the MSA where population also grew more. However, the 
correlation between the change in HMO penetration and population growth is only 0.018 and 
hence this should not be a problem. Another possible source of endogeneity is that managed 
care organizations may prefer those areas where hospitals are already providing little charity 
care. There is also the possibility that unobservable variables are correlated with both managed 
care market share and the probability of providing certain services. For instance, patients’ 
preferences for health care, or the health status of the population may be important omitted 
variables. To correct for these two problems we will use an instrumental variable (IV) approach.  
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A possible instrument for the change in HMO penetration that has been widely used in the 
literature is the average firm size in the corresponding MSA, as first used by Baker (1997). Since 
large firms are more likely to offer managed care to their employees, areas with large firms are 
expected to have more managed care. However, large firms are not correlated with the services 
provided by the hospitals. The average firm size in the MSA is 29.098 workers. The correlation 
between average MSA firm size and the change in HMO penetration is 0.12. 
Demographic characteristics: They include the logarithm of the average family income in the 
MSA and the percentage of population older than 65. The demographic information comes from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Other MSA characteristics: They include the size of the metropolitan area, the percentage of 
uninsured in the MSA and the percentage of the MSA population with Medicaid and Medicare. 
The information comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
V. Methods and Results 
The main objective of the paper is to understand the role that financial pressures can play on 
the provision of charity care by hospitals. However, we would also like to be able to understand 
the effect that managed care, through its effect on the provision of charity care by hospitals, 
could have on access to care for the uninsured. For this, we will look at the effect that managed 
care has had on the overall number of hospitals and services in an MSA, and, in particular, 
whether this effect is different (i.e., more negative) for the hospitals and services traditionally 
used by the uninsured. 
For each MSA we consider four mutually exclusive hospital types: government hospitals 
(henceforth, government), teaching-non-government hospitals (henceforth, teaching), non-
teaching-non-government hospitals located in poor areas (henceforth, poor) and other hospitals 
(henceforth, other). Our unit of analysis will be the group of hospitals. Notice that the mutually 
exclusive categories have been established in such a way to allow us to determine the driving 
force behind the provision of uncompensated care. Previous literature (Currie and Fahr, 2001) 
has already singled-out public hospitals from the rest. This is why we included all public 
hospitals in the first group and the other two categories have been established to be mutually 
exclusive. The results obtained if we group the hospitals as government, poor-non-government 
and teaching-non-poor-non-government are robust with the ones presented here.  
To illustrate how our data will look, consider a fictitious MSA such as the one depicted below. 
It contains three public hospitals (P), two government (G), one teaching (T) and five other 
hospitals (H). There are also two emergency rooms in poor hospitals, two in government 
hospitals, one in a teaching hospital and three in other hospitals. In this case, for each MSA we 
would have a maximum of four observations (corresponding to the four quasi-hospital types). 
For each observation we would have some explanatory variables (such as dummies for the 
quasi-hospital type: teaching, government, poor and other) and a set of dependent variables 
(for example, number of hospitals or number of emergency rooms in the quasi-hospital group).  
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In the fictitious MSA considered here, the data corresponding to the four observations in a 
particular year would look like this (the first four columns are dummy explanatory variables 
and the last two correspond to dependent variables): 
 
Teaching Poor Government Other # hospitals # ER
Obs. 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
Obs. 2 0 1 0 0 3 2
Obs. 3 0 0 1 0 2 2
Obs. 4 0 0 0 1 5 3  
 
Our data contains 894 quasi-hospitals in the 371 United States MSAs, with a maximum of four 
quasi-hospitals per MSA. There are 122 quasi-hospitals containing only the teaching hospitals 
in the corresponding MSA, 257 including only the non-teaching government hospitals in the 
MSA, 171 consisting of non-teaching-non-government hospitals located in poor 
neighborhoods, and 344 comprising other hospitals. As usual, we have eliminated psychiatric 
hospitals, hospitals that are a unit of an institution, and rehabilitation hospitals. 
Finally, another thing to take into account in our data is the hospital mergers that took place 
between 1985 and 1995 in the United States. After merging, the two hospitals responded the 
AHA survey as a single entity. In the AHA, the service questions are of the type “do you have 
an emergency room?”, “do you have an obstetrics unit?” and so on. This means that maybe 
what we encounter is a reduction on the number of services simply due to the fact that 
hospitals had merged and are reporting as a single unit. In order to take this into account we 
have followed a procedure that has already been used in the literature (see, for instance, Mas 
and Seinfeld, 2008). Imagine the case in which two hospitals a and b merge in year 2 of our 
sample and that both these hospitals had an emergency room in year one. In our data this 
would correspond to a reduction in the number of emergency rooms, since in year 1 two 
hospitals would have reported having one ER and in year 2 only one hospital (the one resulting 
from the merger) would report having emergency room. In order to avoid this and to be 
conservative in the effect that managed care could have in the number of hospitals and services 
provided, we have modified our data in the following way: we have gone backwards and for all 
the years prior to the merger, we have generated a consolidated hospital that would correspond  
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to the merged entity from a and b year 2 backwards. Thus, in year our example, in year 1, what 
we would see is only one hospital that would include the services from hospitals a and b.
10 
4.1. Testing Whether Managed Care Has a More Severe Effect on the Closure of 
Safety Net Hospitals  
According to our first hypothesis, we expect financial pressures imposed by managed care to 
disproportionately affect the closure of safety net hospitals, since they have now seen their 
ability to cross-subsidize ameliorated by managed care. 
To test whether this is the case we will define as our dependent variable the change in the 
number of hospitals of each type (government, teaching, poor and other) from 1985 and 1995. 
As previously stated, these are the relevant years for the diffusion of managed care in the 
United States. 
We expect this growth to be lower (or even negative) in areas where the rise in managed care 
penetration ( HMO ∆ ) is larger and we also expect the impact of managed care to be 
particularly severe for the safety net hospitals. Hence we will also include the interaction of the 
change in managed care enrollment with each type of safety net hospital – government (G), 
teaching (T) and hospitals located in poor areas (P). 
As stated in our third hypothesis, a hospital’s resistance to closure might be different if it is the 
only one of its type in the MSA. Hence, we will include also the ONLY dummy and we will 
interact it with all the hospital types, since the type of pressure that a hospital might receive to 
remain open might vary with it. For instance, there might be a lot of public pressure to keep the 
only public hospital in a metropolitan area open. 
Finally, we will also control for hospital variables (SIZE) and for the demographic 
characteristics (DEM) of the MSA. 
Our empirical strategy uses the following specification: 
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
G HMO T HMO P HMO HMO Number of hospitals
ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = − ∆
* * *
* * * ) 95 85 ( , , , ,
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
G HMO T HMO P HMO HMO Number of hospitals
ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = − ∆
* * *
* * * ) 95 85 ( , , , ,
 
Where the subindex i indicates each hospital group in the MSA, and in each MSA there are four 
groups (the first contains all the government hospitals in the MSA, the second one the 
teaching-non-government, etc.) ∆HMO refers to the change in the level of HMO enrollment in 
the corresponding MSA. Government (G) is a dummy variable equal to one if the hospital group 
contains the government hospitals in the MSA; teaching (T) is a dummy variable equal to one 
for the group composed by the MSA hospitals that are teaching-non-government; poor (P) is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation includes the non-teaching-non-government 
hospitals located in poor areas; H refers to the characteristics of the average hospital in the 
quasi-hospital; M corresponds to the market characteristics; D to the demographics of the area 
considered. Finally, our regressions also include states fixed effects. Our benchmark case 
corresponds to the non-safety net hospitals. 
                                              
10 Another option would be to simply eliminate the hospitals that have merged from our data and test whether the 
results are robust. These regressions are available from the authors and the results obtain are robust with the ones 
presented in the paper.  
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The results are presented in Table 3. They include the OLS regressions (specification [1]) as well 
as the corresponding results instrumenting managed care enrollment with firm size. The 
coefficients in both cases are consistent. To test for robustness we also run the same regressions 
using logs for the dependent variable and with and without demographic and market control 
variables. The results are robust. 
The first column of Table 3 shows that the increase in managed care enrollment has had a 
negative but not significant effect on the number of benchmark hospitals. However, this effect 
becomes significantly negative for government hospitals and hospitals located in poor areas. 
The average increase in HMO enrollment between 1985 and 1995 (0.111) implies that the 
number of hospitals would decrease by 2.6 and 1.8 percent more in poor areas and government 
hospital groups respectively, than in the benchmark case. 
Table 3 also confirms that being the only hospital of a certain type in the MSA has a positive 
effect on survival, as expected from our hypothesis. However, surprisingly, this plays a positive 
effect for hospitals located in poor areas, while is not the case for government hospitals. 
Overall, this first set of results confirms our first hypothesis of managed care’s financial 
pressures having a negative effect on the number of safety net hospitals. In particular, the 
impact is especially severe for public hospitals and for those located in poor areas. 
a.    Testing the effect of managed care on the provision of hospital services most used by the 
uninsured 
Our second hypothesis states that hospitals facing strong financial pressures imposed by 
managed care might react by trying to “avoid” non-paying patients. One way of achieving this 
is by not offering the services most commonly used by the uninsured. As previously 
established, these are emergency rooms (ER), obstetrics – these two both fall under the anti-
dumping regulation – and alcohol and drug treatments. We expect this reaction to managed 
care penetration to be stronger for the safety net hospitals, since they are the ones faced with 
the largest share of charity care patients that they now find harder to cross-subsidize. 
To test whether this is the case, we will look at the effect of the increase in managed care 
enrollment on the following set of dependent variables (Y): the change in the number of 
emergency rooms, the change in the number of hospitals offering obstetric services and the 
change in the number of hospitals that offer alcohol and drug treatment centers. 
Our empirical strategy uses the following expression: 
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
G HMO T HMO P HMO HMO Number of hospitals
ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = − ∆
* * *
* * * ) 95 85 ( , , , ,
l i i i i i i i msa l i i i
i i msa i i msa i i msa i msa i
G ONLY T ONLY P ONLY ONLY DEM SIZE G T P
G HMO T HMO P HMO HMO Number of hospitals
ε ψ ν ϕ λ η γ ρ ω θ
δ β α φ
+ + + + + + + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = − ∆
* * *
* * * ) 95 85 ( , , , ,
 
The explanatory variables are the same as in the previous test and they are included for the 
same reasons as the ones established in section 4.2. 
Results are presented in Table 4. They show that a rise in HMO enrollment has a more negative 
effect on the number of hospitals that offer ER, obstetric units and inpatient centers for alcohol 
and drug treatment, for government hospitals and hospitals located in poor areas. Interestingly, 
this is not the case for outpatient alcohol and drug treatment centers. 
The average increase in HMO enrollment between 1985 and 1995 implies that the number of 
hospitals with ER services would fall by 7.4 and 2.8 percent more in government hospitals and  
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in those located in poor areas, than in the baseline ones. The number of hospitals that offer 
obstetric services would decrease by 5.8 percent more in poor area hospitals than in the 
baseline case and the number of inpatient alcohol and drug treatment centers would diminish 
by 5.8 and 1.9 percent more in poor hospitals and in government hospitals, respectively, than 
in the baseline ones. 
The effect of managed care on the number of these services provided by teaching hospitals is 
not significantly different from zero. Finally, we observe that the change in HMO enrollment 
does not have an effect on the number of alcohol and drug treatment centers provided on an 
outpatient basis. In fact, during this period, 46 percent of the hospitals that closed their 
inpatient center for patients with alcohol and drug problems already had an outpatient center, 
and the 12 percent of the hospitals that did not have one opened new outpatient centers for 
alcohol and drug treatment (AHA Annual Survey). Hence, there seems to be a tendency for 
hospitals to substitute this type of inpatient care with outpatient service, especially in areas 
where managed care pressures are important. This tendency does not significantly differ 
whether it is a teaching, government or poor hospital group. To test whether this is the case, we 
created a variable that accounts for the overall number of alcohol and drug treatment centers in 
a group of hospitals regardless of their inpatient or outpatient status. Results using this 
dependent variable are reported in columns [9] and [10] of Table 4, and show that managed 
care did not differently affect  different hospital types regarding the provision of the overall 
alcohol and drug inpatient and outpatient centers. 
Another interesting set of variables is the one that accounts for the fact that hospitals that are 
the only ones of their type in an MSA may react differently as they face different market 
pressures. On the other hand, certain types of hospitals, mainly government ones, may be 
forced to remain open if they are the only one in the MSA. As expected according to our third 
hypothesis, the ONLY dummy is positive. It is significantly different from zero for the change in 
the number of hospitals in the market, obstetrics and outpatient centers for alcohol and drug 
treatment. The interaction of this dummy with government hospital is positive and significant 
for the change in ER, obstetrics and alcohol and drug treatment centers. 
However, all these results could only be reflecting the fact that safety net hospitals are less 
efficient to start with, and they have been forced to shut down or to terminate their services 
with the introduction of managed care. To see if managed care has a differential effect for the 
services most commonly used by the uninsured, reflecting that it is making it more difficult for 
hospitals to cross-subsidize charity care, we will also look at the effect of an increase in the 
HMO enrollment for other types of hospital services that are not disproportionately used by 
charity care patients. Results are presented in Table 5. 
None of the coefficients corresponding to the interaction of the change in HMO enrollment and 
safety net hospital types is significant. However, given that the AHA survey only asks whether 
the hospital provides the service, if a hospital closes some of its units but is still offering the 
service no change will be shown in the data. Hence, our findings may show that managed care 
has no significantly different effect on poor and teaching hospitals from the control group, 
when, in fact, the number of units of service available has been reduced. To rule out this 
possibility, in the last three columns of Table 5 we take advantage of the fact that the AHA also 
asks about the number of beds assigned to cardiac intensive care, burn care and 
medical/surgical intensive care. In none of the cases has managed care had a differential impact 
on poor, government and teaching areas regarding the number of beds assigned to a particular  
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service. Here, the only dummy remains generally positive. When interacted with government 
markets it is only significant and positive for the change in dental services. 
Our results from Table 4 and Table 5 confirm that managed care has had a disproportionate 
effect on the number of services often used by the uninsured, even more so for the safety net 
hospitals. 
V. Conclusions 
Traditionally, safety net hospitals have been able to finance part of the charity care they 
provide through a complex system of cross-subsidies. A rise in price competition and a 
reduction of their revenues from insured patients might threaten this delicate equilibrium. 
To evaluate the importance of financial pressures on the provision of charity care by hospitals, 
we look at the impact of managed care. 
The managed care boom has been one of the most important changes in the United States 
healthcare market and it has contributed to decreasing the reimbursement to hospitals and 
doctors in the whole marketplace. 
The results of this paper show that managed care penetration, by rising price competition and 
reducing hospital revenues, has exacerbated the closure of safety net hospitals. Moreover, the 
ones that remain open disproportionately terminate the provision of those services generally 
used by the uninsured in areas where managed care enrollment is higher. This is especially the 
case for government hospitals. 
These results have important implications for uninsured patients’ access to care. A reduction of 
the number of safety net hospitals and their higher termination of the services traditionally 
used by the uninsured implies that the average patient in the area has to travel longer distances 
to obtain medical care. Numerous works in health economics literature find a negative elasticity 
of distance on access to care (see, for instance, Currie and Reagan, 1998, or Goodman et al., 
1997). Further research should focus on the ultimate impact that managed care has had on 
access to care and quality of care for the uninsured.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 15 
References 
American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine (2000), “No Health 
Insurance? It’s enough to Make you Sick,” Philadelphia, American College of Physicians-
American Society of Internal Medicine. 
American Hospital Association (1986), “Cost and Compassion: Recommendations for Avoiding 
a Crisis in Care for the Medically Indigent,” Chicago. 
Baker, L. (1997), “The effect of HMOs on fee-for-service health care expenditures. Evidence 
from Medicare,”  Journal of Health Economics, 16. 
Baker, L. (1999), “Association of managed care market share and health expenditure for fee-for-
service Medicare patients,” Journal of the American Medical Association, pp. 432-437. 
Baker, L. and S. Shankarkumar (1997), “Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures: Evidence 
from Medicare, 1990-1994,” NBER Working Paper 6187. 
Burguess J., D. A. DeFiore (1994), “The effect of distance to VA facilities on the choice and level 
of utilization of VA outpatient services,” Social Science and Medicine, July. 
Cousineau, M. (1997), “Health Status of and Access to Health Services by Residents of Urban 
Encampments in Los Angeles,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 
February. 
Currie, J. and J. Fahr (2001), “Hospitals, Managed Care and the Charity Caseload in California,” 
NBER Working Paper 8621. 
Currie, J. and P. Reagan (1998), “Distance to hospital and children’s access to care: is being 
closer better, and for whom?,” NBER Working Paper 6836. 
Cutler, D. and J. Barro (1997), “Consolidation in the Medical care Marketplace: a Case Study for 
Massachusetts,” NBER Working Paper 5957. 
Cutler, D. and M. McClellan (1996), “The Determinants of Technological Chance in Heart Attack 
Treatments," NBER Working Paper 5751. 
Cutler, D. M. and L. Sheiner (1998), “Managed care and the growth of medical expenditures,” 
NBER Working Paper 6140. 
Doorslaer, E. et al. (1997), “Income-Related Inequalities in Health: some International 
Comparisons,” Journal of Health Economics, vol. 16, pp. 93-112. 
Duke, K. (1996), “Hospitals in a changing healthcare system,” Health Affairs, 15(2), pp. 49-61. 
Ettner, S. (1996), “New Evidence on the Relationship between Income and Health,” Journal of 
Health Economics, (15), pp. 67-85. 
Frank, R. and R. Salkever (1991), “The Supply of Charity Services by Not-For-Profit Hospitals: 
Motives and Market Structure,” RAND Journal of Economics, 22(3), pp. 430-445. 
Freeman, H., L. Aiken, R. Blendon, and C. Corey (1990), “Uninsured working-Age Adults: 
Characteristics and Consequences,” Health Services Research, February.  
16 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Freeman, E. and C. Corey (1993), “Insurance Status and Access to Health Services among Poor 
Persons,” Health Services Research, 24(6). 
Fournier and Campbell (1997), “Indigent Care as Quid Pro Quo in Hospital Regulation,” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, November. 
Gold, M.R. et al. (1995), “A National survey of the arrangements Managed Care Plans Make 
with Physicians,” New England Journal of Medicine; 333 (25), pp. 1678-1683. 
Kaiser (2008), “The Uninsured: A Primer,” The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, October. 
Levit, K., H. Lazenby, and B. Braden (1998), “National health Spending Trends,” Health Affairs, 
17. 
Luft, S. and R. Miller (1997), “Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?,” 
Health Affairs, September-October. 
Mas, N. and J. Seinfeld (2008), “Is Managed care restraining the adoption of technology by 
hospitals?,” Journal of Health Economics, 27, pp. 1026-1045. 
Meara, E. (1998), “Why is Socioeconomic Status Related to Health?,” mimeo. 
Melnick, G. and J. Zwanziger (1995), “State Health Care Expenditures under Competition and 
Regulation, 1980 through 1991,” American Journal of Public Health, 85(10). 
Richardson, E. (1999), “Managed Care and Access to Care by the Poor,” mimeo. 
Shoor, R. and C. Hughes (1993), “Cities Struggle to Pay for Health Care,” Business and Health, 
1993. 
Sloan, F., M. Morrisey, and J. Valvona (1986), “Hospital Care for the ‘Self Pay’ Patient,” Journal 
of Health Politics, Policy and Law, vol. 13, pp. 83-102. 
Stern, R., J. Weissman, and A. Epstein (1991), “The Emergency Department as a Pathway to 
Admission for Poor and High-Cost Patients,” JAMA, 1991.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 17 
Table 1 
Uncompensated Care by Hospital Type 
UC Share          Mrkt Share UC/Expenses 
Hospital type 1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 1995
Ownership
Non-For-Profit 55.60% 55.80% 58.06% 59.64% 4.10% 5.00%
For-Profit 4.10% 5.30% 15.10% 15.35% 3.10% 4.20%
Government 40.30% 38.90% 26.84% 25.01% 11.12% 12.27%
Teaching Status
Major public teaching 25.20% 26.50% 1.46% 1.52% 8.20% 9.10%
Major private teaching 4.60% 12.40% 5.28% 4.88% 13.60% 14.50%
UC Share          Mrkt Share UC/Expenses 
Hospital type 1985 1995 1985 1995 1985 1995
Ownership
Non-For-Profit 55.60% 55.80% 58.06% 59.64% 4.10% 5.00%
For-Profit 4.10% 5.30% 15.10% 15.35% 3.10% 4.20%
Government 40.30% 38.90% 26.84% 25.01% 11.12% 12.27%
Teaching Status
Major public teaching 25.20% 26.50% 1.46% 1.52% 8.20% 9.10%
Major private teaching 4.60% 12.40% 5.28% 4.88% 13.60% 14.50%
 
Source: American Hospital Association. 
UC refers to Uncompensated Care, that includes charity care and bad debt. 
UC share refers to the percentage of total uncompensated care provided by each hospital type. 
MKT share refers to percentage of total hospital beds provided by each hospital group. 
 
Table 2.a 
Summany Statistics. Dependent Variables 
Variable in 1985 Variable in 95/variable in 85
Variable Name Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
# Hospitals
Poor 3.082 4.793 0.722 0.366
Teaching 3.025 4.175 0.874 0.238
Government 2.564 2.685 0.822 0.307
Other 6.706 10.068 0.832 0.243
# Emergency Rooms
Poor 2.146 2.846 0.658 0.439
Teaching 2.836 3.784 0.840 0.353
Government 1.416 1.857 0.722 0.466
Other 4.738 6.570 0.798 0.348
# Obstetrics 
Poor 1.392 1.800 0.714 0.515
Teaching 2.459 3.407 0.833 0.310
Government 1.058 1.556 0.708 0.453
Other 3.480 4.798 0.853 0.441
# Inpatient Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 0.930 1.349 0.450 0.623
Teaching 1.246 2.191 0.565 0.490
Government 0.537 0.824 0.580 0.658
Other 2.241 3.420 0.663 0.653
# Outpatient Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 0.649 1.076 0.561 0.646
Teaching 1.115 2.272 0.914 0.620
Government 0.339 0.774 0.450 0.573
Other 1.404 2.348 0.844 0.691
# Any Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 1.041 1.420 0.576 0.655
Teaching 1.533 2.679 0.858 0.513
Government 0.661 1.089 0.607 0.655
Other 2.439 3.830 0.791 0.688
Variable in 1985 Variable in 95/variable in 85
Variable Name Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
# Hospitals
Poor 3.082 4.793 0.722 0.366
Teaching 3.025 4.175 0.874 0.238
Government 2.564 2.685 0.822 0.307
Other 6.706 10.068 0.832 0.243
# Emergency Rooms
Poor 2.146 2.846 0.658 0.439
Teaching 2.836 3.784 0.840 0.353
Government 1.416 1.857 0.722 0.466
Other 4.738 6.570 0.798 0.348
# Obstetrics 
Poor 1.392 1.800 0.714 0.515
Teaching 2.459 3.407 0.833 0.310
Government 1.058 1.556 0.708 0.453
Other 3.480 4.798 0.853 0.441
# Inpatient Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 0.930 1.349 0.450 0.623
Teaching 1.246 2.191 0.565 0.490
Government 0.537 0.824 0.580 0.658
Other 2.241 3.420 0.663 0.653
# Outpatient Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 0.649 1.076 0.561 0.646
Teaching 1.115 2.272 0.914 0.620
Government 0.339 0.774 0.450 0.573
Other 1.404 2.348 0.844 0.691
# Any Alcohol & Drug Care Units
Poor 1.041 1.420 0.576 0.655
Teaching 1.533 2.679 0.858 0.513
Government 0.661 1.089 0.607 0.655
Other 2.439 3.830 0.791 0.688   
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Table 2.b 
Summary Statistics. Dependent Variables. Control Group of Services 
Variable in 1985 Variable in 95/ Variable in 85
Variable Name Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
# Dental Care Units
Poor 1.380 1.561 0.277 0.413
Teaching 2.533 3.733 0.561 0.430
Government 1.374 1.728 0.367 0.454
Other 2.959 4.186 0.352 0.473
# Cardiac Intensive Care Units
Poor 2.041 2.833 0.465 0.429
Teaching 2.828 3.858 0.795 0.320
Government 1.074 1.653 0.526 0.544
Other 4.350 6.239 0.646 0.413
# Burn Care Units 
Poor 0.240 0.442 0.150 0.362
Teaching 1.221 1.189 0.573 0.467
Government 0.097 0.346 0.357 0.451
Other 0.416 0.785 0.239 0.448
# Medical/Surgical Intensive Care (MSIC)
Poor 2.163 3.133 0.623 0.442
Teaching 2.844 3.783 0.802 0.292
Government 1.218 1.765 0.729 0.465
Other 4.683 6.594 0.759 0.333
# Cardiac IC Beds 
Poor 7.667 12.318 0.784 0.819
Teaching 25.934 40.102 1.156 1.287
Government 3.210 8.013 0.764 0.816
Other 16.785 29.365 1.076 1.031
# Burn Care Beds
Poor 0.626 3.001 0.852 0.962
Teaching 7.361 9.023 0.834 0.519
Government 0.296 1.624 0.699 0.709
Other 0.933 3.680 0.754 0.906
# MSIC Beds
Poor 23.772 35.408 0.768 0.730
Teaching 64.377 87.167 1.095 0.600
Government 11.202 17.774 0.923 0.727
Other 52.125 80.200 0.959 0.687
Variable in 1985 Variable in 95/ Variable in 85
Variable Name Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
# Dental Care Units
Poor 1.380 1.561 0.277 0.413
Teaching 2.533 3.733 0.561 0.430
Government 1.374 1.728 0.367 0.454
Other 2.959 4.186 0.352 0.473
# Cardiac Intensive Care Units
Poor 2.041 2.833 0.465 0.429
Teaching 2.828 3.858 0.795 0.320
Government 1.074 1.653 0.526 0.544
Other 4.350 6.239 0.646 0.413
# Burn Care Units 
Poor 0.240 0.442 0.150 0.362
Teaching 1.221 1.189 0.573 0.467
Government 0.097 0.346 0.357 0.451
Other 0.416 0.785 0.239 0.448
# Medical/Surgical Intensive Care (MSIC)
Poor 2.163 3.133 0.623 0.442
Teaching 2.844 3.783 0.802 0.292
Government 1.218 1.765 0.729 0.465
Other 4.683 6.594 0.759 0.333
# Cardiac IC Beds 
Poor 7.667 12.318 0.784 0.819
Teaching 25.934 40.102 1.156 1.287
Government 3.210 8.013 0.764 0.816
Other 16.785 29.365 1.076 1.031
# Burn Care Beds
Poor 0.626 3.001 0.852 0.962
Teaching 7.361 9.023 0.834 0.519
Government 0.296 1.624 0.699 0.709
Other 0.933 3.680 0.754 0.906
# MSIC Beds
Poor 23.772 35.408 0.768 0.730
Teaching 64.377 87.167 1.095 0.600
Government 11.202 17.774 0.923 0.727
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Table 3 
Managed care effects on the number of hospitals 
OLS IV
HMO change*poor -0.237** -0.265**
[0.122] [0.16]
HMO change*teaching -0,116 -0,124
[0.120] [0.121]








HMO Change -0,020 -0,040
[0.070] [0.070]
Only hospital 0.131** 0.125**
[0.022] [0.023]
only hospital*poor 0.070* 0.081**
[0.036] [0.038]
only hospital*Teaching 0,060 0,064
[0.039] [0.040]
Only hospital*gov 0,009 0,018
[0.028] [0.030]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes




Robust standard errors appear in brackets. 
All regressions include 51 state dummy variables and 7 MSA size dummy variables. 
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4 
Managed Care Effects on the Services Provided 
ER Obstetrics     Inp. alcoh&drug  Outp. alcoh&drug Any alcoh&drug
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 7] [8] [9] [10]
HMO change*poor -0.258* -0.311** -0.527* -0.438* -0.526** -0.534* 0.688 0.417 -0.490 -0.528
[0.143] [0.215] [0.293] [0.249] [0.270] [0.278] [0.679] [0.716] [0.547] [0.567]
HMO change*teaching -0.189 -0.195 0.094 0.113 -0.461 -0.369 0.198 0.115 -0.381 -0.293
[0.194] [0.198] [0.240] [0.254] [0.487] [0.505] [0.626] [0.628] [0.543] [0.564]
HMO change * gov -0.668** -0.624** -0.245 -0.259 -0.175** -0.184** 0.028 -0.455 -0.273 -0.287
[0.289] [0.292] [0.353] [0.367] [0.075] [0.078] [0.671] [0.627] [0.535] [0.551]
Poor -0.075 -0.105* -0.081 -0.117 -0.119 -0.104 -0.132 -0.071 -0.044 -0.016
[0.058] [0.063] [0.079] [0.085] [0.125] [0.133] [0.145] [0.146] [0.128] [0.134]
Teaching 0.059 0.034 -0.285** -0.289** -0.113 -0.096 0.209 0.232 0.192 0.213
[0.086] [0.087] [0.086] [0.093] [0.148] [0.151] [0.226] [0.218] [0.157] [0.160]
Government 0.082 0.076 -0.123* -0.128* -0.043 -0.018 -0.147 -0.103 -0.054 -0.023
[0.059] [0.060] [0.067] [0.070] [0.110] [0.116] [0.130] [0.137] [0.107] [0.111]
HMO Change 0.005 0.063 -0.094 -0.050 -0.415* -0.470 0.022 0.104 0.455 0.516
[0.118] [0.120] [0.184] [0.191] [0.251] [0.373] [0.390] [0.387] [0.365] [0.377]
Only hospital 0.024 0.021 0.183** 0.210** 0.103 0.090 0.358** 0.374** 0.035 0.028
[0.069] [0.074] [0.087] [0.096] [0.200] [0.204] [0.159] [0.153] [0.198] [0.198]
Only hospital*poor 0.040 0.063 0.162 0.201 -0.377 -0.324 -0.518** -0.526* -0.345 -0.281
[0.107] [0.114] [0.131] [0.141] [0.279] [0.290] [0.265] [0.268] [0.275] [0.286]
Only hospital*Teaching 0.043 0.043 0.334** 0.349** -0.287 -0.363 -0.128** -0.130 -0.546** -0.608
[0.097] [0.103] [0.108] [0.115] [0.255] [0.261] [0.284] [0.289] [0.258] [0.261]
Only hospital*gov 0.125* 0.129* 0.090** 0.156 0.305* 0.285* -0.493 -0.494* -0.234 -0.214
[0.073] [0.074] [0.041] [0.128] [0.181] [0.144] [0.275] [0.257] [0.235] [0.233]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894
R2 0.154 0.163 0.180 0.202 0.268 0.286 0.289 0.331 0.237 0.265
ER Obstetrics     Inp. alcoh&drug  Outp. alcoh&drug Any alcoh&drug
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 7] [8] [9] [10]
HMO change*poor -0.258* -0.311** -0.527* -0.438* -0.526** -0.534* 0.688 0.417 -0.490 -0.528
[0.143] [0.215] [0.293] [0.249] [0.270] [0.278] [0.679] [0.716] [0.547] [0.567]
HMO change*teaching -0.189 -0.195 0.094 0.113 -0.461 -0.369 0.198 0.115 -0.381 -0.293
[0.194] [0.198] [0.240] [0.254] [0.487] [0.505] [0.626] [0.628] [0.543] [0.564]
HMO change * gov -0.668** -0.624** -0.245 -0.259 -0.175** -0.184** 0.028 -0.455 -0.273 -0.287
[0.289] [0.292] [0.353] [0.367] [0.075] [0.078] [0.671] [0.627] [0.535] [0.551]
Poor -0.075 -0.105* -0.081 -0.117 -0.119 -0.104 -0.132 -0.071 -0.044 -0.016
[0.058] [0.063] [0.079] [0.085] [0.125] [0.133] [0.145] [0.146] [0.128] [0.134]
Teaching 0.059 0.034 -0.285** -0.289** -0.113 -0.096 0.209 0.232 0.192 0.213
[0.086] [0.087] [0.086] [0.093] [0.148] [0.151] [0.226] [0.218] [0.157] [0.160]
Government 0.082 0.076 -0.123* -0.128* -0.043 -0.018 -0.147 -0.103 -0.054 -0.023
[0.059] [0.060] [0.067] [0.070] [0.110] [0.116] [0.130] [0.137] [0.107] [0.111]
HMO Change 0.005 0.063 -0.094 -0.050 -0.415* -0.470 0.022 0.104 0.455 0.516
[0.118] [0.120] [0.184] [0.191] [0.251] [0.373] [0.390] [0.387] [0.365] [0.377]
Only hospital 0.024 0.021 0.183** 0.210** 0.103 0.090 0.358** 0.374** 0.035 0.028
[0.069] [0.074] [0.087] [0.096] [0.200] [0.204] [0.159] [0.153] [0.198] [0.198]
Only hospital*poor 0.040 0.063 0.162 0.201 -0.377 -0.324 -0.518** -0.526* -0.345 -0.281
[0.107] [0.114] [0.131] [0.141] [0.279] [0.290] [0.265] [0.268] [0.275] [0.286]
Only hospital*Teaching 0.043 0.043 0.334** 0.349** -0.287 -0.363 -0.128** -0.130 -0.546** -0.608
[0.097] [0.103] [0.108] [0.115] [0.255] [0.261] [0.284] [0.289] [0.258] [0.261]
Only hospital*gov 0.125* 0.129* 0.090** 0.156 0.305* 0.285* -0.493 -0.494* -0.234 -0.214
[0.073] [0.074] [0.041] [0.128] [0.181] [0.144] [0.275] [0.257] [0.235] [0.233]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894
R2 0.154 0.163 0.180 0.202 0.268 0.286 0.289 0.331 0.237 0.265
 
Robust standard errors appear in brackets. All regressions include 51 state dummy variables and 7 MSA size dummy variables. 
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  
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Table 5 
Managed Care Effects on Number of Services in the Market. Control Group 
Dental         Cardiac IC      Burn Care      Medical/Surgical IC Cardiac IC Beds  Burn Beds 9   Med/Surg IC Beds
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
HMO change*poor -0.379 -0.383 -0.001 -0.078 0.525 0.365 -0.218 -0.268 0.133 0.153 4.548 3.607 -0.238 -0.4
[0.379] [0.402] [0.144] [0.251] [0.464 [0.454] [0.216] [0.227] [0.648] [0.639] [4.848] [3.883] [0.476] [0.484]
HMO change*teaching 0.191 0.257 0.182 0.241 [0.359 0.335 0.001 -0.026 -0.934 -0.598 1.353 1.752 -0.219 -0.358
[0.301] [0.311] [0.220] [0.231] [0.473] [0.468] [0.189] [0.197] [0.729] [0.733] [2.052] [1.983] [0.371] [0.388]
HMO change*Gov -0.098 -0.078 -0.096 -0.067 -0.974 -0.842 -0.209 -0.208 -2.027 -1.521 -2.284 -1.583 -0.105 -0.321
[0.251] [0.259] [0.314] [0.318] [1.088] [1.114] [0.334] [0.340] [1.550] [1.281] [3.213] [3.300] [0.518] [0.515]
Poor -0.044 -0.057 -0.089 -0.085 -0.147 -0.147 -0.055 -0.065 -0.213 -0.221 -0.955 -0.854 -0.114 -0.128
[0.086] [0.091] [0.064] [0.067] [0.112] [0.113] [0.060] [0.061] [0.158] [0.171] [1.439] [1.163] [0.116] [0.124]
Teaching -0.009 -0.012 -0.138 -0.145 0.251 0.284* -0.109 -0.091 0.107 0.111 -0.030 0.183 0.120 -0.069
[0.100] [0.103] [0.090] [0.093] [0.169] [0.167] [0.077] [0.080] [0.368] [0.382] [0.510] [0.441] [0.144] [0.148]
Gov -0.047 -0.056 -0.057 -0.053 0.155 0.163 0.084 0.092 -0.013 -0.023 0.291 0.292 -0.009 0.018
[0.063] [0.066] [0.079] [0.080] [0.254] [0.257] [0.061] [0.062] [0.198] [0.203] [0.540] [0.476] [0.093] [0.091]
HMO change 0.055 0.084 0.091 0.059 -0.327 -0.333 0.046 0.094 0.082 0.051 -1.293 -1.811 -0.229 -0.397
[0.209] [0.216] [0.154] [0.161] [0.338] [0.337] [0.126] [0.127] [0.567] [0.537] [1.824] [1.800] [0.263] [0.269]
Only hospital -0.118 -0.107 0.017 0.022 0.347 0.346 0.173** 0.178** 0.272 0.066 1.328** 1.393** 0.053 0.110
[0.097] [0.082] [0.094] [0.100] [0.242] [0.249] [0.059] [0.063] [0.369] [0.237] [0.619] [0.563] [0.117] [0.124]
Only hospital*poor 0.096 0.051 -0.073 -0.048 -0.158 -0.011 -0.093 -0.091 -0.409 -0.221 -0.585 -0.624 -0.011 -0.015
[0.135] [0.140] [0.132] [0.139] [0.310] [0.365] [0.098] [0.104] [0.423] [0.171] [1.127] [1.001] [0.192] [0.199]
Only hospital*Teaching 0.220* 0.179 0.154 0.179 -0.251 -0.258 0.035 0.024 -0.282 0.111 -1.533** -1.659** 0.118 0.074
[0.132] [0.137] [0.115] [0.122] [0.266] [0.270] [0.080] [0.085] [0.491] [0.382] [0.644] [0.618] [0.169] [0.176]
Only hospital*gov 0.303** 0.287 0.110 0.095 -0.206 -0.213 -0.208 -0.199 0.674 -0.022 0.307 -0.334 0.125 0.119
[0.123] [0.130] [0.135] [0.139] [0.460] [0.464] [0.298] [0.185] [0.481] [0.203] [1.022] [0.889] [0.182] [0.189]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market characteristics
N 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894
R2 0.163 0.292 0.240 0.252 0.269 0.352 0.183 0.220 0.204 0.194 0.211 0.225 0.258 0.273
Dental         Cardiac IC      Burn Care      Medical/Surgical IC Cardiac IC Beds  Burn Beds 9   Med/Surg IC Beds
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
HMO change*poor -0.379 -0.383 -0.001 -0.078 0.525 0.365 -0.218 -0.268 0.133 0.153 4.548 3.607 -0.238 -0.4
[0.379] [0.402] [0.144] [0.251] [0.464 [0.454] [0.216] [0.227] [0.648] [0.639] [4.848] [3.883] [0.476] [0.484]
HMO change*teaching 0.191 0.257 0.182 0.241 [0.359 0.335 0.001 -0.026 -0.934 -0.598 1.353 1.752 -0.219 -0.358
[0.301] [0.311] [0.220] [0.231] [0.473] [0.468] [0.189] [0.197] [0.729] [0.733] [2.052] [1.983] [0.371] [0.388]
HMO change*Gov -0.098 -0.078 -0.096 -0.067 -0.974 -0.842 -0.209 -0.208 -2.027 -1.521 -2.284 -1.583 -0.105 -0.321
[0.251] [0.259] [0.314] [0.318] [1.088] [1.114] [0.334] [0.340] [1.550] [1.281] [3.213] [3.300] [0.518] [0.515]
Poor -0.044 -0.057 -0.089 -0.085 -0.147 -0.147 -0.055 -0.065 -0.213 -0.221 -0.955 -0.854 -0.114 -0.128
[0.086] [0.091] [0.064] [0.067] [0.112] [0.113] [0.060] [0.061] [0.158] [0.171] [1.439] [1.163] [0.116] [0.124]
Teaching -0.009 -0.012 -0.138 -0.145 0.251 0.284* -0.109 -0.091 0.107 0.111 -0.030 0.183 0.120 -0.069
[0.100] [0.103] [0.090] [0.093] [0.169] [0.167] [0.077] [0.080] [0.368] [0.382] [0.510] [0.441] [0.144] [0.148]
Gov -0.047 -0.056 -0.057 -0.053 0.155 0.163 0.084 0.092 -0.013 -0.023 0.291 0.292 -0.009 0.018
[0.063] [0.066] [0.079] [0.080] [0.254] [0.257] [0.061] [0.062] [0.198] [0.203] [0.540] [0.476] [0.093] [0.091]
HMO change 0.055 0.084 0.091 0.059 -0.327 -0.333 0.046 0.094 0.082 0.051 -1.293 -1.811 -0.229 -0.397
[0.209] [0.216] [0.154] [0.161] [0.338] [0.337] [0.126] [0.127] [0.567] [0.537] [1.824] [1.800] [0.263] [0.269]
Only hospital -0.118 -0.107 0.017 0.022 0.347 0.346 0.173** 0.178** 0.272 0.066 1.328** 1.393** 0.053 0.110
[0.097] [0.082] [0.094] [0.100] [0.242] [0.249] [0.059] [0.063] [0.369] [0.237] [0.619] [0.563] [0.117] [0.124]
Only hospital*poor 0.096 0.051 -0.073 -0.048 -0.158 -0.011 -0.093 -0.091 -0.409 -0.221 -0.585 -0.624 -0.011 -0.015
[0.135] [0.140] [0.132] [0.139] [0.310] [0.365] [0.098] [0.104] [0.423] [0.171] [1.127] [1.001] [0.192] [0.199]
Only hospital*Teaching 0.220* 0.179 0.154 0.179 -0.251 -0.258 0.035 0.024 -0.282 0.111 -1.533** -1.659** 0.118 0.074
[0.132] [0.137] [0.115] [0.122] [0.266] [0.270] [0.080] [0.085] [0.491] [0.382] [0.644] [0.618] [0.169] [0.176]
Only hospital*gov 0.303** 0.287 0.110 0.095 -0.206 -0.213 -0.208 -0.199 0.674 -0.022 0.307 -0.334 0.125 0.119
[0.123] [0.130] [0.135] [0.139] [0.460] [0.464] [0.298] [0.185] [0.481] [0.203] [1.022] [0.889] [0.182] [0.189]
Demographic Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hospital Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market characteristics
N 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894
R2 0.163 0.292 0.240 0.252 0.269 0.352 0.183 0.220 0.204 0.194 0.211 0.225 0.258 0.273
 
Robust standard errors appear in brackets. All regressions include 51 state dummy variables and 7 MSA size dummy variables. 
* Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 